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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES PROHIBITING SALES BELOW COST.
-In recent years there have been some peculiar developments in the
field of statutory regulation of business. Stemming from the National
Industrial Recovery Act and the codes which resulted therefrom has
come a wave of legislation designed to prevent various unfair trade
practices. This wave found recent expression in Congress through the
Robinson-Patman Act, and in almost all the states through the statutes
known as "fair trade practice acts". The state statutes are in the form
of enabling laws which grant the right to the manufacturer of trade-
marked articles to fix, by contract with the wholesaler or retailer, the
price at which his product must be sold. These contracts were held
illegal at common law,' but the statutes have been held constitutional.
2
There has been a regrettable tendency to confuse these "fair trade prac-
tice acts" involving, at least indirectly, vertical price fixing with an even
more recent development, the state statutes prohibiting the sale of goods
below cost, involving horizontal price fixing.- They apply to all goods
whether trade-marked or not, and are variously designated as "unfair
competition acts," "unfair practices acts," and "fair sales acts." In this
connection it is interesting to note that the Robinson-Patman Act for-
bids sales at "unreasonably low prices" with intent to injure competi-
tion or to eliminate a competitor.4 It is with the statutes prohibiting
sales below cost that this note will deal. 5
Several types of "unfair practices acts" have been passed in the dif-
ferent states. California in 1935 6 passed the one which has evidently
influenced the greatest number of other legislatures. It prohibits sales
below cost (as defined) when done "for the purpose of injuring com-
petitors or destroying competition." The law applies to all persons
engaged in business and so evidently includes manufacturers as well as
retailers and wholesalers. This statute makes the practice of selling
below cost a crime as well as providing that anyone damaged by a vio-
lation may secure an injunction to prevent similar acts in the future
and triple the damages caused by previous offenses. Tennessee varied
the statement of unlawful purpose and intent required to include decep-
tion of the purchaser as well as injuring competition.7 In Connecticut
1 Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911) and cases
cited therein.
2 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936).
8 See for discussion and criticism of this confusion, McAllister, Price Control
by Law in the United States (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 273 et seq.
4 49 Stat. 1528, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13a (Supp. 1936).
5 For a history of the development of statutory regulation of prices, see
McAllister, supra note 3.
6 Cal. St. 1935, p. 1548, GEN. LAWS CAL. (Deering, 1937) Act 8781, §§ 1-17.
t Tenn. Acts 1937, c. 69, TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams Supp. 1937) §§ 6670.7-
6670.13.
NOTES
and Louisiana where the statute was limited in effect to the retail drug
trade, the law forbids sales below cost regardless of intent.
8
The statutes define "cost" generally as being invoice or replacement
cost, whichever is lower, and inclusive of the proper proportion of the
cost of doing business. In California the elements which must be
included in the cost of doing business are prescribed in the statute. In
Tennessee the cost of retailing is presumed to be six per cent of the
selling price unless the contrary is shown. In order to limit the scope of
this treatment, the questions of constitutionality arising out of the
unreasonable or arbitrary nature of terms or definitions in the various
statutes will be ignored here except as they indirectly bear upon the
question of Whether these statutes violate the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 9 by regulat-
ing business outside the scope of the states' police power.' 0
By these statutes certain sales are specifically excepted from the pro-
hibitions therein contained. The following is an enumeration of the
common exceptions provided for: (1) bona fide clearance sales, (2)
sales of imperfect or damaged articles, (3) sales in liquidation of busi-
ness, (4) sales for charitable purposes, (5) sales made under direction
of a court, (6) sales at prices set to meet the legal prices of competitors.
In 1938 the New Jersey State Legislature passed a law forbidding
all sales below cost (retail and wholesale) without mention of intent."
This statute provides for collection by the state of a penalty ranging
from fifty to one hundred dollars for each violation, and at the same
time indicates that anyone injured by violations may seek an injunction
to prevent their continuation. The definition of cost does not include an
allowance for the proportion of overhead applicable. This type of stat-
ute was prophesied by one writer when he said in discussing the
feasibility of requiring intent to injure competition as an element of fie
violation of the statute: "The troublesome phrase may have grown out
of doubts as to the constitutionality of a flat provision of sales below
'cost', but experience may show that the constitutional hurdle will have
to be met directly if the object is to be gained." 12 Doubts as to the
constitutionality of a statute such as the one now in effect in New
8 McAllister, supra note 3, at p. 298, n. 141.
9 U. S. Const. Art. XIV.
10 For consideiations of some of these questions, see: Hamilton, Cost as a
Standard for Price (1937), 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 321; Note (1938) 47 Yale
L. J. 1201. Slight variations exist in many of the statutes, although they are usu-
ally modeled after the one in California. The following states have these laws:
Ariz. Laws 1937, c. 44; Ark. Acts 1937, Act 253; Colo. Laws 1937, c. 261; Ky.
STAT. ANN. (Carroll 1936) § 4748h; Md. Laws 1937, c. 211; Minn Laws 1937, c.
116; Neb. Laws 1937, c. 137; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1937) tit. 73, § 201;
Utah Laws 1937, c. 21; Wyo. Laws 1937, c. 73.
11 N. J. STAT. ANNuAL 1938, § 56:4-7.
12 McAllister, supra note 3, at p. 299.
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Jersey were based on the holding in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minne-
sota 13 where the Supreme Court said, quoting from Tyson & Brothers
Ticket Offices v. Banton:14 "It is not permissible to enact a law which,
in effect, spreads an all dnclusive net for the feet of everybody upon the
chance that, while the innocent will surely be entangled in its meshes,
some wrongdoers may also be caught." In that case a statute was passed
forbidding price discrimination by creameries in purchasing milk. This
statute superseded a former one forbidding the same practice where
done with the intent of creating a monopoly, restraining trade, or injur-
ing either competitors or competition. The statute not requiring an
unlawful purpose as an element of the offense.was declared unconstitu-
tional as repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution.x5 It appears that such doubts were well founded, since in a
recent case in New Jersey, State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc.,1
the statute prohibiting sales below cost (regardless of intent) was
declared unconstitutional.
Before considering the New Jersey decision, however, it will be best
to consider the decisions upholding the statutes in other jurisdictions,
remembering of course the different nature of otlier statutes. In Cali-
fornia we find three cases involving the constitutionality of its statute.
The first in point of time was People v. Kahn 17 involving a prosecution
for making a sale below, cost with intent to injure competition. The
statute was held constitutional because it only incidentally affected
prices in an attempt to prevent unfair competition which was clearly
within the police power of the state..
The court anticipated the New Jersey holding in deciding one ques-
tion of construction. Due to ambiguous punctuation, it was uncertain
upon a literal reading of the statute whether the phrase concerning the
intent to injure competition applied to the prohibition of sales below
cost as well as to gifts of merchandise. (Clearly it applied to the latter.)
The court said in determining that the intent was meant to be an ele-
ment of both offenses-"Where reasonable construction of statute pro-
hibiting sale of any article, product, or service below cost to vendor for
purpose of injuring and destroying competition aided in preventing
statute from infringing constitution, statute would be construed as pro-
hibiting selling below cost only when done to injure competitors or
destroy competition." 18
The statute went unchallenged in California after this decision until
the case of Balzer v. Caler 19 (followed in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers
18 274 U. S. 1 (1927), at p. 10.
14 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
15 U. S. Const. Art. XIV.
16 2 Ad. (2d) 599 (N. J. Dist. Ct. 1938).
17 19 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 60 P. (2d) 596 (1936).
18 Headnote and 60 P. (2d) 596 at p. 598.
19 74 P. (2d) 839 (Cal. App. 1937).
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Association v. National Candy Tobacco Co.) 20 which was affirmed on
another point on rehearing before a higher court.21 In this case the
plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from making
sales below cost with intent to injure a competitor and destroy compe-
tition. The court held the statute unconstitutional on three grounds.
The first was that it was not uniform in operation 22 because it did not
have the same effect on the retailer buying in small quantities as on one
buying in large quantities, since cost would be lower to the second
retailer. Secondly the court declared that the definition of cost was too
indefinite to be constitutional. The third and most important ground
relied upon was that the statute fixed prices for a business not affected
with a public interest. 23
On rehearing before the Supreme Court of California in Wholesale
Tobacco Dealers Association v. National Candy Tobacco Co.,24 the
court held the statute constitutional. The court said that the statute
did not have to secure identical results in every case in order to be
uniform in operation, and that the exception applicable to sales below
cost made to meet competitor's legal prices made. it possible for the
statute to secure identical results. It refused. to determine whether the
definition of cost was too indefinite because the issue was not properly
presented by the facts. Since there was a fairly debatable question as
to whether the economic policy behind the statute was desirable, the
legislative determination was final. Price fixing is not per se unconsti-
tutional, but it can become so only when the statute is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or irrelevant to the purpose of the legislature. The court
emphasized that it was well within the police power of the state to
safeguard, against monopoly and foster competition by prohibiting
unfair and discriminatory trade practices.25 The court relied mainly on
Nebbia v. New York 26 to show that price fixing was not necessarily
unconstitutional where the purpose of the law was clearly within the
police power of the state.
Again in this case there is a reiteration of the principle that an abso-
lute prohibition of sales below cost regardless of intent might be uncon-
stitutional because unreasonable.
27
20 74 P. (2d) 848 (Cal. App. 1937). Case was reversed on appeal to Supreme
Court of California, 82 P. (2d) 3 (Cal. 1938).
21 82 P. (2d) 19 (Cal. 1938). Court held that case was not proper one for
decision on the constitutionality of the statute, but affirmed dismissal of complaint.
22 Cal. Const. Art. I.
23 For discussion and comment on this case, see the following: Notes (1938)
S Chi. L. Rev. 524, (1938) 86 Pa. L. Rev. 780, (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1201.
24 82 P. (2d) 3 (Cal. 1938). In this decision the court overruled the written
opinion in Balzer v. Caler followed in this case below.
25 82 P. (2d) 3, at pp. 9-10.
26 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
27 82 P. (2d) 3, at p. 17.
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Next we come to a consideration of the decision declaring the Ten-
nessee statute constitutional. In that case, Rust v. Griggs,28 a competi-
tor sought to enjoin the defendant from violating the statute. The court
reasoned along the same line as the California court in People v. Kahn
in declaring the statute constitutional. It declared that the statute was
not a price fixing statute although it incidentally affected prices. The
law was designed to prevent fraud and corruption, to foster free com-
petition, and to prevent monopolies and was hence clearly within the
state's police power (citing cases). It emphasized the point that sales
below cost were not denounced unless made with the requisite intent
and effect of deceiving the public or destroying competition. The court
said: "Construed as above the statute is freed from many of the con-
stitutional objections urged against it".29 In other words the court infi-
mated that a statute which did not require intent would be unconsti-
tutional.3 0
In recent cases, Associatcd Merchants of Montana v. Ormesher,3eo
and State v. Langley,8ob Montana and Wyoming held their statutes,
both modeled after the one in California, constitutional because the
prevention of unfair competition and monopoly was a proper exercise
of the state's police power. In Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Ervin,30 a federal court held the Minnesota statute prohibiting sales
below cost with intent to injure competition a valid exercise of the
police power on the same ground. The statute, however, was held un-
constitutional because the means used were arbitrary and discriminatory.
The statutory definition of cost which is different than that in other
states was the chief basis for this holding. However, the court also de-
clared unconstitutional the provision making a retailer owning several
outlets in the state guilty of unfair competition if he varied prices on
the same merchandise in different localities and the effect of the variance
was to injure competition. The reason given by the court for this hold-
ing was that the provision did not prescribe intent but only effect as an
element. This holding was a clear precedent for the New Jersey decision
being even more drastic in its implications. It is interesting to note that
insofar as the statute prescribed that the sale of goods below cost be re-
garded as presumptive evidence of intent to violate the provision re-
quiring intent to injure competition, the court held it unconstitutional.
It said that the legislature was without power to make a man pre-
sumptively guilty of crime. These provisions held unconstitutional
28 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S. W. (2d) 733 (1938).
29 113 S. W. (2d) 733, at p. 735.
80 For a discussion of this case, see Note (1938) 86 Pa. L. Rev. 780.
3o 86 P. (2d) 1031 (Mont. 1939).
30b 84 P. (2d) 767 (Wyo. 1938).
300 23 F. Supp. 70 (1938).
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are peculiar to the Minnesota statute, and for the purpose of this note,
the case is in substantial accord with the holdings of other jurisdictions
already discussed.
In this situation the stage was set for a declaration on a statute like
that passed in New Jersey. State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc.,
was an action brought for the recovery of the penalty provided for by
the statute. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the "Fair Sales Act" (as the statute is called in New Jer-
sey). was unconstitutional. The defendant had admittedly advertised
"loss leaders" to attract customers to its store for the purpose of selling
in addition to "loss leaders," merchandise priced at a normal profit
level. The goods were sold at the advertised prices. The court said that
the statute was a price fixing law and unconstitutional because it regu-
lated all businesses whether affected with a public interest or not.
Furthermore in this case the business of the defendant was not affected
with a public interest.8 1 The court refused to follow Rust v. Griggs or
Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Association v. National Candy Tobacco Co.
because the decisions in those cases were based on a dissimilar type of
statute, implying in a negative way that those statutes would be consti-
tutional in New Jersey. Next the court considered the case of Nebbia
v. New York which has been recognized as the most liberal of all cases
involving the right of the state to regulate business,8 2 and which was
relied on to uphold the constitutionality of the California statute as has
already been pointed out. The court determined that the case had not
altered the well established rule that a statute fixing prices for a busi-
ness not "affected with a public interest" was unconstitutional.8 3 The
Nebbia Case had these distinctive features: the act involved was a tem-
porary emergency measure designed to cope with a chaotic condition in
the milk industry; it referred to and dealt with one industry alone, not
all of them; and that one industry is as much as, if indeed, not more
than any other, vitally affected with public concern.
34
Obviously a decision like this, if upheld in the appellate courts (if
and when appealed), will have a profound effect upon the future of
legislation of this type. The difficulty of establishing the intent to injure
competition as required by the other type of statutes may prove an
effective stumbling block in the path of their enforcement, unless, as
suggested, 5 the sale itself be regarded as presumptive evidence of the
unlawful intent. In fact, unless these statutes are interpreted to create
the presumption, the statute will be but a codification of the common
31 2 Atl. (2d) 599, at p. 601.
32 Wilson, 'Herring and Eutsler, PuBLic UTirY REoULATION, McGraw-Hill,
(New York, 1938), at p. 4.
38 2 AtI. (2d) 599, 603.
34 2 Atl. (2d) 599, at pp. 603-4.
85 Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1201, 1205.
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law.3 6 At common law the presence of a mixed motive was held to
justify an act done partly to injure a competitor and partly for the
purpose of helping the actor's legitimate business, where the act was
otherwise lawful.37 It is possible that even the statutes requiring intent
may be interpreted as eliminating the justification of the mixed motive
since they do not require that the intent to injure be the sole intent,
but it is probable that the unlawful intent will have to be the sole one
in order for a sale to be unlawful, especially in criminal or penal cases.
In Tennessee and some of the other states where the intent required
may be, in the words of the statute, "to tend to deceive or mislead any
purchaser or prospective purchaser" as well as injury to competition,
the intent will be, in all likelihood, easier to establish.
What are the possibilities that this decision in New Jersey may be
overruled on appeal? Probably they are very slim especially in view of
the square holding in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota against the
constitutionality of a similar type of statute. In Booth v. Illinois,88
however, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed a view
which might under certain conditions permit a court to hold the statute
constitutional. In that case the law held constitutional prohibited deal-
ings in futures options. The court said: 39 "If, looking at all the circum-
stances that attend, or may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a partic-
ular calling, the state thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be suc-
cessfully reached unless that calling be actually prohibited, the court
cannot interfere, unless looking through mere forms and at the sub-
stance of the matter, it determines that the statute enacted professedly
to protect the public morals has no real or substantial relation to that
object, but is a clear unmistakable infringement of rights secured by
the fundamental law. (Citing cases.)" Thus it would seem that if sales
below cost with intent to injure others iust be prohibited in the inter-
ests of public welfare, and if such sales could not be prevented without
prohibiting all sales below cost because most sales below cost are of
the prohibited type, and a law requiring intent cannot be enforced; then
the New Jersey statute might not be an unwarranted abridgment of
the right of freedom of contract. However it was on this theory that
the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the statute 40 later held uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. In dismissing
that contention advanced by the state, the Court said: 4 1 "But all those
cases recognize the duty of the court to inquire into the real effect of
36 See Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911) and
cases cited therein, especially Tuttle v. Buck 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909);
Cupp, THE UNFAIR PRACTICES AcT (1936) 10 So. Calif. L. Rev. 18.
37 See Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203 (1923).
38 184 U. S. 425 (1901).
39 184 U. S. 425, at p. 429.
40 State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714 (1925), 168
Minn. 378, 210 Minn. 163 (1926).
41 274 U. S. 1, at p. 11.
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the statute duly challenged because of interference with freedom of
contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and to declare it
invalid when it is without substantial relation to some evil within the
power of the state to suppress and a clear infringement of private
rights." The only conclusion possible to draw from these cases is that
the New Jersey statute would have to be clearly necessary for the pur-
pose of preventing the assumed evils of sales below cost. Surely such
necessity is less obvious here than it is in an attempt to prevent gam-
bling in futures as in the case of Booth v. Illinois. Here the intent to
deceive customers or injure competition will be more apparent than the
intent to gamble cotld ever be in a futures transaction.
In the "Fair Sales Act" are found some evidences of a legislative
intent to bar sales below cost only when the intent to injure is an ele-
ment. Most of the exceptions to the prohibition in the statute relate to
sales below cost where the intent could not be to injure others. However,
these exceptions were undoubtedly borrowed from other state statutes
which include intent as an element. Certainly the maxim, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, should apply here; and any attempt by a
court to include intent as an element must be labeled as judicial
legislation.
Probably the legislature did not wish to establish that all sales below
cost are undesirable and against public policy regardless of intent. A
question necessarily arises, however, as to the constitutionality of such
an absolute prohibition. The New Jersey Court specifically held that it
was not constitutional. An examination of Nebbia v. New York, how-
ever, discloses some language that might lead to a holding-that it is a
constitutional use of that power. The Supreme Court said in that
case: 42 "Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitu-
tional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to
the policy the legislature is free to adopt . . . " The court specifically
repudiated the doctrine of "affectation with a public interest" 43 as a
valid test to determine whether a business is subject to regulation. It
said: 44 "The phrase . . .. can . . . mean no more than that an indus-
try, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good."
In rejecting the doctrine so well established in the law, and in pointing
out that price fixing was not per se unconstitutional, the Court set up
a new test equally as indefinite as the one repudiated when it stated: 45
"There can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate
measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, includ-
42 2.91 U. S. 902, at p. $37.
43 For a history of this doctrine in the law, see: Hamilton, Affectation With
Public Interest in SELE=cmE ESSAYS ON; CoNsTirruoNAL. LAW (1938), Vol. 11, p.
494.
44 291 U. S. 502, at p. 536.
45 291 U. S. 502, at p. 537.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ing the prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restrictions, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may be deemed to promote public welfare."
It is to be noted that even here, we must determine what is "proper
occasion" and what are "appropriate measures." Furthermore the Court
did not state that all business was affected with a public interest or, in
other words, "subject to regulation for the public good." The New Jer-
sey statute is an attempt to regulate all business in a certain aspect;
it is horizontal, rather than vertical in its scope. It does not fall directly
within the principles laid down in the Nebbia Case, even assuming that
the case is authority for those propositions. It thus becomes hard to
believe that the decision on the New Jersey statute will be reversed on
appeal, unless the law is to undergo an almost revolutionary change.
If the statute is of doubtful validity in the law, the economic policy
behirid it is at least just as subject to question. The laws have not been
in effect long enough as vet to be able to judge their effect, but cer-
tainly the statutes represent a departure from the principles of the com-
petitive system as it has existed. They are designed to aid the smafler
independent distributors in their fight against chain store systems and
the larger department stores. In effect they represent a subsidy thrown
to the inefficient agents of distribution. Probably the justification of
these laws will have to be largely political rather than economic. In New
Jersey where all sales below cost are prohibited, the departure from
older standards is even more obvious. Part of the consideration in any
sale below cost is obviously the opportunity afforded the seller to dis-
pose of other goods at a normal profit margin. Cost does not therefore
form a good standard for price fixing; and since no retailer will sell
goods below cost in every case except to injure competition, the blanket
prohibition seems an unwarranted limitation on the right to compete on
moral terms. Morally the liberty of the individual should not be inter-
fered with except where clearly necessary for the common good. Prob-
ably the legislature wished to affect only the sales with intent to injure
others; legally the legislature should be made to say so. There is prob-
ably no practice in business which some person or class of persons does
not regard as undesirable. There is always one or more minorities in
every election who emphatically disagree with the majority. Our legal
validity of this opposition. Yet it is impossible to be consistent with




CONSTRUCTION OF THE ILLINOIS DRAm SHOP ACT IMPOSING LIA-
BILITY UPON TAVERNKEEPER AND His LESSOR FOR INJURI s CAUSED
By INTOXICATED PERSONS.-Seventy years ago, long prior to the Car-
rie Nation crusade, when the old-fashioned brass rails and swinging
doors were singularly connotative of the saloon, and the curtained
windows of the "stag" bar-rooms were disgustfully occultic to the gen-
tle ladies of this Victorian era, the Illinois Legislature enacted a law
bearing the title "An act to provide against the evils resulting from the
sale of intoxicating liquors in this state." That was in 1872.
Today, we have passed through the Carrie Nation era, had our
taste of National Prohibition. "Repeal," so widely heralded, has for-
mally done away with the saloon, the brass rails, the swinging doors, the
curtains. Legally in their stead we have "taverns," their mystery pre-
cluded by "unobstructed view" regulations, the brass rails replaced with
restaurant stools, and tables, the ladies' disgust lulled into a com-
placency by the lifting of social bans.
Unaltered however, through the lapse of these seven decades with
their variegated predilections, is the substance of the Act of 1872, now
Section 135 of The Dram Shop Act, which frovides:
"Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other
person, who shall be injured in person or property, or means of sup-
port by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication,
habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his
or her own name, severally or jointly against any person or persons
who shall by selling or giving alcoholic liquor have caused the in-
toxication in whole or in part of such person; and any person own-
ing, renting, leasing, or permitting the occupation of any building
or premises, and having knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold
therein, or who having leased the same for other purposes, shall know-
ingly permit therein, the sale of any alcoholic liquors that have caused
in whole or in part the intoxication of any person shall be liable, sever-
ally, or jointly, with the person or persons selling or giving alcoholic
liquors aforesaid, for all damages sustained, and for exemplary dam-
ages..." 1
Illinois, it should be understood, is not alone in creating civil lia-
bility statute, designed to protect against injuries resulting from in-
toxicated persons. Colorado,2 Iowa,s Kansas, 4 Massachusetts, 5 Michi-
1 ILL. REv. STAT. (1937), c. 43, § 135.
2 Coo. STAT. ANNt. (1935) c. 50, §6. Liability confined to person who sells or
gives away intoxicating liquors to an habitual drunkard after notice to desist.
3 CODE OF IOWA (1935) c. 90, § 2055. Liability confined to person who sells or
gives away intoxicating liquors contrary to the provisions of this title. See also
c. 100, § 2084.
4 GENERAL STAT. OF KAN. (1935) c. 21, § 2151. Owner of premises liable for
intoxication caused by liquor sold, given away, or furnished contrary to law to
any person, if the owner has knowledge of it.
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gan,6 Minnesota,7 New York," Nebraska, 9 North Dakota,
10 Okla-
homa,"1 Ohio,1 2 Pennsylvania, 13 Wisconsin, 14 and Vermont15 have
statutes on the same subject. However, Illinois is the only state which
has adopted such stringent means to accomplish this end.
The purpose of this writing is a determination of the construction
which the courts of Illinois have placed upon this statute. For conven-
ience, the statute has been divided into three substantive divisions, and
it will be discussed in the following order: I. Liability of the actual
dispenser of the intoxicating liquors. II. Liability of the owner of the
premises. III. Rights of those to whom the cause of action accrues.
5 GENERAL. LAws or MAss. (1932) c. 138, §§ 49 and 50. Liability of vendor,
and owner of premises identical with that in Illinois statute, except that owner is
excused if the occupant of the premises holds a license to sell such liquors. Also,
any lessor when judgment is rendered against him, may sue the actual vendor to
recoup his loss, in a contract action.
6 Comp. LAws OF MICH. (1929) c. 175, § 9193. Liability confined to the per-
son who unlawfully sells, gives away or furnishes intoxicating liquors, which causes
intoxication in whole or in part.
7 MASON'S MINN. STAT. (1927) c. 16, § 3239. Liability confined to persons who
cause intoxication by illegal sale, barter or gift of intoxicating liquors.
8 C~Aun's CoNsoL.. LAWS or N. Y. (1930) c. 7, § 16.Liability extends to per-
sons who have caused or contributed to intoxication of another by unlawful selling
to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such person.
9 Comp. STAT. OF NEB. (1929) c. 53, § 147. Liability extends to any person,
association- or corporation who sells, supplies' or furnishes intoxicating liquor to
another, where such sale, etc., causes or contributes to an injury either to the
intoxicated one, or another.
10 Rav. ConEs or No. DAX. (1905) c. 65, § 9376. Liability confined to any one
who sells, barters or gives away intoxicating liquors which have caused the intox-
ication.
11 BurNN'S CoNY. OQELA STAT. (1921) c. 52, § 7034. Liability confined to any
one who sells, barters or gives away intoxicating liquors in violation of this chap-
ter, which causes the intoxication of another.
12 TnRocx. Onio STATE CODE ANN. (1936) c. 15, §§ 6203, 6204 and 6209.
Liability extends to persons who sell or give away liquor to one whom the depart-
ment of liquor control has forbidden the use of such to, after issuance of order of
such department, if sale or gift causes in whole or part intoxication of such person.
Owner also liable where he knowingly permits sale or gift of liquor contrary to
law. Owner's premises subject to execution where he knowingly permits such
illegal sale.
13 PURD. PA. STAT. (Compact Ed., 1936) Tit. 47, § 643. Liability confined to
any persontfurnishing intoxicating drinks to another, in violation of any existing
laws or provisions of this title.
14 Wis. STAT. (1937) c. 176, § 35. Liability confined to those who give or
sell to an habitual drunkard or minor, intoxicating liquors after notice to desist.
15 PuB. LAWs OF VT. (1933) c. 315, Tit. 36 § 8128. Liability confined to one
who sells or gives intoxicating liquor to another, and such causes his intoxication.
Owner liable only if the sale is unlawful, and he knew or should have known that
the occupant kept or sold liquor contrary to law.
NOTES
I. LIABILITY OF THE DISPENSER OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
-From its very title it is seen that this Act was passed to regulate the
evils inherent in the sale of intoxicating liquor. Its application was
early restricted to include only those persons directly or indirectly en-
gaged in the liquor business 16 whether lawfully or unlawfully 17 so
engaged. In Aden v. Cruse '8 the defendant was not connected in any
way with the liquor business; he was sued by the wife of one who be-
came intoxicated by liquor which the defendant had given him on
election day, as a present. The court, in holding the defendant not
liable, declared: this section does not give a right of action against one
"whom in his own house or elsewhere, as an act of courtesy or polite-
ness treats a friend to a glass of intoxicating liquor without any pur-
pose of gain or profit." 10 In a later case, one who was actually engaged
in the liquor business, a brewery owner, gave drinks to his guests at his
place of residence, when they visited him while ill; as a result one
became intoxicated. Again, the court refused to hold the host liable,
philosophizing: "If one invites his friends to drink with him, and
generous wine which cheers the heart is pressed upon the guests, one
of whom happened to be excited with wine when he came there, is the
host to be incarcerated for giving to this most bibulous guest an ad-
ditional glass? We do not think the statute should be given that con-
struction. The culture of the grape is recommended by the moralist
and the economist, and the expression of its juices into wine. Would
it be an offense.., should the visitor from his wine press fill a flagon
and serve it to his guests in his own house at his table? Where is the
difference in a brewer presenting a tankard under similar circum-
stances. We cannot believe this law was designed to punish such acts." 20
By the "pre-prohibition" cases, it would seem those were engaged in
the "liquor business" and thus within the purview of this act, who
either sold alcoholic liquors generally and commonly used for consump-
tion, or sold liquids containing alcohol, even though not manufactured
or generally used for consumptive purposes, with knowledge that such
were to be consumed, or as a shift or device to evade the Dram Shop
Act. In Walker v. Dailey 2 'this latter rule was determined. A grocery
clerk sold an eight ounce bottle of lemon extract to a customer, who
got intoxicated therefrom, and died. The wife's petition, in a suit against
the grocer, was dismissed in the lower court, though there was evidence
that the clerk knew the decedent was going to use the lemon extract to
drink. The appellate court reversed the trial court, and remanded the
cause for a new trial, declaring knowledge by the clerk that such was to
16 Aden v. Cruse, 21 Ill. App. 391 (1887), Aff'd. 127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73 (1889).
17 Clears v. Stanley, 34 M. App. 338 (1889).
18 21 I1. App. 391, aff'd. 127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73 (1889).
19 Id. at 400.
20 Albrecht v. People, 78 IIl. 510 (1875).
21 101 Ill. App.,575 (1901).
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be used for consumption was sufficient to make the grocer liable. Then,
by way of dicta, they expressed the opinion that if the purpose of mer-
chanting such lemon extract was to avoid the regulations of the Dram
Shop Act, liability would also ensue. Justice Brown, in a minority opin-
ion in this case impressive in its reasoning, held the Dram Shop Act was
not intended to regulate this type of commodity, and thus no right of
action accrued to the wife of the deceased, because the injury was not
caused by alcoholic liquor within the purview of the act.
22
This minority opinion of Justice Brown would seem to be the rule in
Illinois today by statute. In an act bearing the title "An act relating to
alcoholic liquors" passed in 1934 by the Illinois legislature, and in which
the civil liability statute is incorporated, the phrase "alcoholic liquor"
is expressly defined to exclude flavoring extracts among other things.
23
This express definition and exclusion, it is submitted, is an exhaustive
determination of just what and who are to be regulated in liquor busi-
ness. Unless the vendor actually sells alcoholic liquor within such de-
fined limits, it would seem no liability would ensue, for the reason that
he is not within the purview of the statute.
In addition to being engaged in the alcoholic liquor business, a sec-
ond requisite for liability of the dispenser is the "selling" or "giving"
away of such liquor. The case of Austin v. Bass,24 intimated that the
liability of the tavernkeeper ensued only when he had directly sold or
given liquor to one who subsequently became intoxicated. In that case
Nell Bass, the owner of an alleged "bootleg" liquor dispensary sold
three bottles of beer to one Austin; said Austin then treated Bass to
one of the bottles he had just purchased from her. This drink, along
with other liquor which she obtained elsewhere made Bass intoxicated,
during which spell she shot and killed Austin. Austin's wife sued Bass
for selling liquor which contributed to her (Bass') intoxication, as a
result of which she killed Austin, and caused Mrs. Austin loss of sup-
port. In refusing to hold Bass liable, the appellate court declared her
responsibility came to an end when Austin, the vendee, gave the beer
back to her as a gift. "It is impossible," said the court, "that by the mere
act of drinking liquor, ordered and paid for by another, a liability can
be imposed on the vendor .. .which would not have existed if that
person had not drank." 25 Also, "under decisions of the Supreme Court
selling of liquor is treated as a contract, and it is said the saloon keeper
has the right to sell to whomever he chooses, or he may refuse to sell;
in other words such saloon keeper has the right to select the persons
with whom he will deal." 2.6 Austin, the court believed, had brought the
trouble upon himself, by treating Bass to the drinks.
22 Id. at 582.
23 ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 43, § 95.
24 206 111. App. 435 (1917).
25 Id. at 441.
26 Id. at 442.
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In the very recent case of Bennett v. Auditorium Bldg. Corp.2G how-
ever, the appellate court declared the reasoning of the Austin case un-
sound, and not in accord with the plain words of the statute. In this
case the plaintiff alleged the tavernkeeper had sold or given liquor to
one X, who got ill as a result of it, and vomited on the tavern floor.
The plaintiff slipped in the vomitus, and was injured in the fall. The
defendant tavernkeeper alleged there was no proof that he had sold or
given directly to X, and there was evidence that X's escort had been the
purchaser of the liquor, and had treated X to it. On judgment being
rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Though reversing
the lower court for reasons not pertinent here, the appellate court held
that the fact that the tavernkeeper did not sell or give directly to X
did not constitute a good defense to the action. "We are unable to agree
with the reasoning of the court in the Austin case," said the court, "The
statute does not say the selling or giving must be directly to the in-
toxicated person." 26b
Though the Bennett case expressly declares the Austin case unsound
in reasoning, it does not disclaim the result of that case. It is submitted
that the two cages can be distinguished by their dissimilar sets of facts.
In the Austin case, the tavernkeeper herself got intoxicated. Since a
tavernkeeper cannot give or sell to herself, within the meaning of this
statute,26" she is not the "vendor" within the meaning of the statute,
when she sells or gives liquor to another, and then receives it back as
a gift; for such a construction would indirectly make the tavernkeeper
the one who sold to herself.
The Bennett case, however, concerns persons other than the tavern-
keeper. A bought the liquor from the tavernkeeper, and gave it to B
his lady friend. Since the technical rule that a tavernkeeper can not
sell to himself does not enter, it seems the tavernkeeper should be held
liable, for he knows the lady friend is the object of the sale, even though
the consideration comes from her companion.
A very recent construction of the words "selling" and "giving" was
given in Gunderson v. First National Bank of Chicago.2 7 The defendant
tavernkeeper "helped himself" to liquor, in his own place of business,
as a result of which he got drunk, and severely injured a customer. The
liquor which he helped himself to, was liquor he had purchased previ-
ously, for re-sale in his tavern. The court held the tavernkeeper not
liable, declaring he could not, by helping himself to his own liquor be
"giving" it away or "selling" it within the contemplation of the statute.
"It is clear," said the court, "that Monaco (the tavernkeeper, defend-
2sa 19 N. E. (2d) 626 (Ill. App. 1939).
26b Id. at 629.
26c Gunderson v. First National Bank of Chicago, 296 Ill. App. 111, 16 N. E
(2d) 306 (1938).
27 296 Ill. App. 111, 16 N. E. (2d) 306 (1938).
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ant) could make neither a sale nor a gift of the liquor to himself." 28 But
it would seem that the injured customer would have a good cause of
action against the wholesaler, or manufacturer who sold the intoxicating
liquor, by barrel, keg, or etc., to the tavernkeeper who actually injured
such customer.
29
A third requisite to the liability of the dispenser of liquor is that he
cause the intoxication, in whole or in part of another. It should be un-
derstood that no cause of action arises in favor of one injured within the
scope of this act, unless the one causing that injury be completely intox-
icated. Just what legal intoxication is, the courts do not define explic-
itly, and it has been held they need not define such in their instructions
to the jury, for it is a plain question of fact, which a jury can readily
understand.80 However, it is more than merely "feeling" the liquor one
has been drinking or being "lightly under the influence of liquor," or
"feeling good." 31
The distinction to be kept in mind then is this: though a cause of
action does not accrue to one injured by a person partially intoxicated,
under this statute, a cause does arise in favor of the injured person
against the dispenser who solely or even partially contributes to one
who becomes completely intoxicated. 82 The minimum quantity which a
dispenser may sell or give, and still not partially contribute to his intox-
ication has never been defined by the courts. It is a question of fact,
varying with the individual. But it has been held that such contribu-
tion must be more than "imperceptible," 33 though one court at least
has refused to instruct that it must be to "an appreciable and essential
degree," because the statute is clear and does not require interpretation,
and such instruction would only tend to mislead the jury.
8 4
In McConnell v. Bogaert 35 the defendant dispenser alleged he had
sold or given only three of the fifteen beers which were alleged to have
caused the intoxication of the plaintiff's husband. The court, however,
held there was sufficient proof of the defendant's contribution to intox-
ication, which it said was all the law required.
The dispenser who merely contributes to the intoxication of one, is
liable to the persons designated in the statute. He is liable either jointly
or severally, at the option of the one who brings the suit. The fact that
another than he has contributed principally to the intoxication is no bar
to the action. In O'Halloran v. Kingston 86 where this latter question
28 Id. at 308.
29 Clears v. Stanley, 34 II. App. 338 (1889).
30 Shorb v. Webber, 188 Il1. 126, 58 N. E. 949 (1900).
31 Id. at 950.
32 Buckworth v. Crawford, 24 Ill. App. 603 (1886).
83 Danley v. I-Ibbard, 222 Ill. 88, 78 N. E. 39 (1906).
84 Hall v. Ditto, 128 Ill. App. 187 (1906).
3a5 208 11. App. 582 (1917).
36 16 Ill. App. 659 (1885)..
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was raised the court complacently replied "those who contribute in a
small degree may be thus made liable to suffer as those who are more
culpable, yet it is a condition which is applied to the traffic in liquors,
which the legislature has power to impose, and which the court cannot
ignore." 37 So in O'Leary v. Frisbee,38 wherein the defendants contended
the intoxication was caused principally by one not joined, the court, in
holding such was no defense declared "if he (the intoxicated one) got
drinks at each of the defendants' saloons which helped to produce his
intoxication, then these defendants are just as liable as they would be
if he got all that he drank at their saloons." 3.,
A very illustrious application of this rule is the case of Earp v.
Lilly.40 There a suit was filed by the wife of an habitual drunkard, who
alleged the defendant tavernkeeper contributed to his habitual intoxi-
cation; the defendant, having operated the premises for only a period
of two and one-half months prior to the bringing of the suit, requested
the court to instruct the jury that he was "not liable in any greater
amount than the amount of damages, if any, as shown by the evidence,
which said plaintiff suffered to her property or means of support (dur-
ing the two and one-half month period) . . . and your verdict for
damages in this suit cannot exceed this amount." The trial court refused
to so instruct, and the supreme court upheld this refusal, saying "it is
apparent the liability created . . . cannot be apportioned between the
several dramshop keepers who furnished the intoxicating liquor which
made him an habitual drunkard, but that each person who assisted in
bringing about that habitual condition must be held, under the statute,
liable for the acts of all persons who contributed by furnishing of intox-
icating liquor to the habitual condition of the drunkard." 41
However, it has been consistently held that the fact that another, not
joined as defendant, contributed materially to the intoxication, may be
shown in mitigation of damages.
4 2
As all who contribute are jointly and severally liable, it is no de-
fense in a suit against partial contributors that a judgment has been
rendered for or against other contributors.43 Nor can one against whom
judgment is rendered, seek contribution from the others who contrib-
uted to the intoxication.44 But the plaintiff can have only one satisfac-
tion of his judgment.
4 5
37 Id. at 662.
38 17 Ill. App. 553 (1885).
89 Id. at 556.
40 217 11. 582, 75 N. E. 552 (1905).
41 Id. at 554.
42 Kelley v. Malhoit, 115 Ill. App. 23 (1904).
48 Wanack v. People, 187 IMI. 116, 58 N. E. 242 (1900).
44 Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87, 74 N. E. 84, aff'g 114 Il. App. 631 (1905).
45 Wanack v. People, 187 Ill. 116, 58 N. E. 242 (1900).
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A fourth, and final requisite to liability of the dispenser of alcoholic
liquors under Section 135 of the Dram Shop Act is an injury to the per-
son, property, or means of support of a husband, wife, parent, child,
guardian, employer or other person, by the intoxicated person, or in
consequence of the intoxication.
A great contrariety of opinion has arisen in the cases on construction
of this part of the statute, as to whether the injury must be a proximate
cause of the injury. In Ross v. Eppy 46 wherein a wife sued for loss of
support because her husband had become an habitual drunkard, and
could not work, the court held the tavernkeeper defendant who had con-
tributed to his condition liable whether such defendant could reason-
ably foresee that habitual drunkenness would be a result or not. So, in
Kennedy v. Whitaker 47 where the intoxicated person, driving a team,
collided with the plaintiff, injuring her person, and property, the court
held the defendant liable "no matter whether the jury consider that
(intoxication) a proximate or remote cause . . . (of the injury)." 48
There are, on the other hand, a host of cases declaring that a proxi-
mate casual connection between the intoxication and the injury are
essential to recovery. One of these: Shugart v. Egan,49 wherein the
intoxicated person insulted one McGraw, who thereupon stabbed the
intoxicated person, killing him. In a suit by the decedent's wife for loss
of support, the court held, as a matter of law that McGraw's stabbing
was an independent act, which cut off the casual connection between
the intoxication and the decedent's death, and the wife was denied
recovery. In Schulte v. Schleeper 50 the same rule was applied, where
the inebriate was assaulted by a third person. Other cases of like nature
have declared one way or the other, increasing instead of lessening
the confusion in the law.
Out of the welter of cases and confusion, however, has come a recent
case which has laid down two principles relative to proximate causation
as applicable to this statute. That case is Haws v. The 1933 Grill.51
The customer in this case became intoxicated by liquor purchases from
a tavernkeeper who knew that this customer became boisterous when
he became intoxicated, contrary to the rules of this tavern. So, when
the customer was ejected by a paid "bouncer," for his festivities, and
injured in the melee, the lower court held the tavernkeeper liable. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, and in
dealing with the proximate causation, declared that there were two
grounds of action given by this statute:
46 80 Ill. 283 (1875).
47 81 Ill. App. 605 (1898).
48 Id. at 607-608.
49 83 III. 56 (1876).
50 210 Ill. 357, 71 N. E. 325 (1904).
51 297 IH. App. 37, 17 N. E. (2d) 71 (1938).
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1. "When the action is for an injury resulting from the direct af-
firmative act of an intoxicated person, the doctrine of proxi-
mate cause has no application, and liability accrues upon proof
of the fact.
2. "But where the action is for injury resulting in consequence of
habitual intoxication or otherwise, it is incumbent upon the
plaintiff to show that such intoxication was the proximate cause
of the injury." 52
This injury to the customer, being not the direct affirmative act of the
intoxicated person, but merely in consequence thereof, proximate cause,
the court held, must be proved. And proved it was they said, for it is
reasonably foreseeable that in a tavern which prohibits boisterousness, a
guest known to get noisy when he gets intoxicated will have to be
ejected, and may be injured during such forced exit in his condition.
This distinction made in the 1933 Grill case thus renders some har-
mony among the apparently conflicting earlier cases. The Kennedy case
comes squarely within the first principal enunciated in the 1933 Grill
case, rendering proof of proximate causation unnecessary. So the Ross
case it would seem can be reconciled; the act of habitual intoxication
caused loss of support to the wife, so proximate causation is unnecessary.
The Shugart and Schulte cases, on the other hand, would come with-
in the second doctrine laid down. Since both of the injuries complained
of were inflicted by third party assailants, they become consequential,
not direct results of the intoxication, and failure to prove proximate
causation by the plaintiff is a bar to recovery.
However, in one case at least, the conflict still persists. There X got
drunk, and shot and killed Y; in a suit by Y's wife, it was held she
must prove proximate causation between the intoxication and the injury
to her. This is direct contravention of the first rule of the 1933 Grill
case, for, the act complained of was the direct affirmative act of X,
the intoxicated person.
52
It would seem then, that the 1933 Grill case has implicitly overruled
all cases requiring a proof of proximate causation where the injury com-
plained of was the direct affirmative act of the inebriate. Though the
second principle laid down is only by way of obiter dictum, it is sub-
mitted that it is a logical construftion of the statute, and one which, if
applied will render more certainty to litigation, and overcome the utter
confusion so rampant in the earlier cases. Such principle too, is in accord
with the weight of authority on similar statutory provisions. 53
52 Id. at 73.'
58 15 R. C. L., § 206, pp. 435-436.
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II. LIABILITY OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES.-The liability of
the owner of the premises on which alcoholic liquor is sold, like the lia-
bility of the actual dispenser, has its basis in the police power of the
state to control the liquor traffic. The philosophy behind the liability of
the owner seems best expressed in an excerpt from Garrity v. Eiger 54
where the court declared: "There has never been any question in any
court but that any conditions which the legislative authority may hedge
about the liquor traffic are legal and valid. Any one . . . leasing his
property for it must necessarily accept and agree to be bound by the
provisions of the law designed to mitigate the evils of the traffic or to
compensate for the damages done by it. Intoxicating liquor cannot be
sold without a place in which the business is conducted, and the owner
who furnishes premises necessary to the carrying on- of the business is
an actual participant in it."
To render the owner of the premises liable, under Section 135 three
things must be proved: (1) a state of facts which would render the
actual dispenser of the alcoholic liquor liable under this section; (2)
that the owner rented the premises in which such liquor was sold,
and, (3) that the owner rented such premises for the sale of liquor, or
alternatively that, though he rented it for other purposes, he knew
liquor was sold thereon.
Proof of these things renders the owner liable jointly or severally
with the actual dispenser. His liability is a primary one, co-existent with
that of the actual dispenser. He may be sued with or instead of the
lessee-dispenser, but in neither case can he seek contribution from the
lessee.5 Nor can the actual dispenser, or the surety on the dispenser's
bond seek contribution from the owner of the premises. 5"1 The statute,
in effect makes the owner and lessee-dispenser joint tort-feasors. Though
each can be sued separately, a judgment against one, returned unsatis-
fied, is not a bar to a subsequent suit against the other.57
Just how far the courts will extend the construction of the word
"Cowner" to render one liable under the act has not been exhaustively
determined. It was stated that one must have "a rentable interest"
to incur liability as owner in Fritz v. Lenp,"-8 but only as obiter dicta.
A very recent case, O'Connor v. Rathje,59 would indicate that the bare
legal title is sufficient to hold one liable as owner. In this case, the
defendant was a successor trustee appointed by the court, of premises
on which intoxicating liquors were sold to one Rogers, as a result of
which he became inebriated and shot and killed the son of the plaintiff.
54 272 Ill. 237, 111 N. E. 735 (1916).
55 Wanack v. Michels, 114 Ill. App. 631, aff'd. 215 Ill. 87, 74 N. E. 84 (1905).
56 Id. at 634.
57 Wanack v. People, 187 Ill. 116, 58 N. E. 242 (1900).
58 229 Ill. App. 45 (1923).
59 19 N. E. (2d) 96 (Ill. App. 1939).
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In the trial court, the plaintiff recovered $35,000 (reduced by renittur
to $20,000) for loss of support. The defendant trustee appealed, and
the appellate court reversed the decision, refusing to hold the trustee,
sued in his fiduciary capacity, liable. The trustee is not liable, the court
declared, for torts committed by him or by the agents or servants in his
employ for "the trust estate can make no contract, and commit no
tort." 60 Also, the court stated "the law will not allow the trust property
to be impaired through the negligence of the trustee or permit him to
create any new or additional liabilities against the trust." 61
However, whether the trustee could be held personally liable for this
tort, the court did not decide, since a motion to dismiss Rathje in his
individual capacity from the action was sustained in the lower court,
and the plaintiff acquiesced in it. By the reasoning of the appellate
Gourt, however, it would seem that Rathje would be liable in a suit
against him personally. The court indicated it regarded him as "owner"
within the contemplation of the statute when it stated: "in a court of
law the trustee having legal title to the real estate together with the
right of possession is regarded as the owner of the property, having all
the rights and subject to all the liabilities of ownership." 62 Further-
more, it indicated Rathje would be liable personally for "the duties of
a trustee as owner make him perspnally liable for torts committed by
him or by the agents or servants in his employ." 63 Though these indi-
cations are, at best, only persuasive authority relative to future cases
which may arise, they are significant as the current -trend of the court.
Should the courts, in the future decide that a trustee is personally liable,
it would, it seems, exhaust the definition of the word "owner" as com-
prehended by this statute, since a trustee is the possessor of perhaps
the barest legal title of any owner known to law.
Under Section 135 of the Dram Shop Act, the owner of the premises
is subjected to liability only after a' personal judgment is rendered
against him. By the next succeeding section of this Act,64 an even more
stringent liability is imposed, namely a lien on his property to satisfy
any judgment rendered against the dispenser of alcoholic liquors, under
Section 135 who is his lessee. In a leading case on the constitutionality
60 Id. at 100.
61 Id. at 100.
62 Id. at 100 (citing 1 PERRY ON TRusTs, § 321).
63 Id. at 100.
64 ILL. REV, STAT. (1937) c. 43, § 136: " . . . and in case any person shall
rent or lease to another any building or premises to be used or occupied, in whole
or in part, for the sale of alcoholic liquors, or shall knowingly permit the same to
be used and occupied, such building or premises so used or occupied shall he held
liable for, and may be sold to pay any such.judgment against any person occupying
such premises. Proceedings may be had to subject the same to the payment of any
such judgment recovered, which remains unpaid, or any part thereof, either before
or after execution shall issue against the property of the person against whom
such judgment shall have been rendered."
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and construction of this section, its stringency can be readily perceived.
Garrity v. Eiger6 5 is this case. Therein the husband of the plaintiff
became intoxicated from imbibing liquor purchased from a certain tav-
ernkeeper; this tavernkeeper was a lessee of the defendant in this case.
Prior to bringing this suit against the defendant owner of the premises,
the plaintiff sued the tavernkeeper individually under Section 135, and
recovered a judgment against him. Without trying to satisfy such judg-
ment against the tavernkeeper, she brought an action against the owner
to have a lien declared on the premises, alleging: (1) judgment against
the saloon keeper; (2) ownership of the property by the defendant;
(3) lease of it by the saloon keeper, and sale of alcoholic liquor thereon
by him; (4) knowledge by the defendant that liquor was being sold on
the premises. Neither a cause of action against the saloon keeper, nor
the damages, were alleged or proved. The trial court declared a lien to
the extent of the judgment rendered against the saloon keeper, and the
defendant appealed to the supreme court declaring the statute was vio-
lative of due process of law in refusing him the right to contest the facts
on which the judgment rested-i.e., saloon keeper's contribution to the
intoxication of the husband of the plaintiff, extent of the injury to the
plaintiff, and whether the sale to the husband was lawful or unlawful.
Defendant also contended he had a right to be notified of the unlawful
sale or giving away by the saloon keeper to the husband, so he could
save himself from prosecution. The court, however, refused to give cog-
nizance to any of these defenses, and affirmed the trial court's declara-
tion of the lien.
In discussing the contentions of the appellant, the court determined
that the owner had no right to contest the facts of the prior judgment
against the saloon keeper for Section 136 of the Act makes the owner
liable when he rents his property to others, and knowingly allows liquor
to be sold thereon. His property is in the nature of a surety, said the
court, liable to execution for a judgment against the tavernkeeper.
In reviewing his contention of a right of notice of unlawful sales by
the saloon keeper, the court declared that the question whether the sale
causing the damage is lawful or unlawful was immaterial, and not a
condition to the liability of the owner, for injury may result from a
lawful sale of liquor to a sober person, where it is taken away and not
to be drunk on the premiess, or a sale to a person not intoxicated may
cause intoxication, and result in injury; in all of such cases the owner's
property is subject to the lien.
In summing up the court declared such law was passed under the
police power and emphatically stated: "if he provides a building or
premises for another to conduct a business, the usual and ordinary
result of which is damage to individuals, he cannot complain that his
property is held to compensate the injured party." 66
65 272 IRI. 237, 111 N. E. 735 (1916).
66 Id. at 738.
NOTES
On a subsequent appeal to the United States Supreme Court 6 7 the
same result was reached, the court declaring there was no right, beyond
the reach of the legislative control, to rent premises for the sale of
intoxicating liquor.
It would seem then, that the landlord has no right to a notice that a
suit against the tavernkeeper is pending, even though a judgment
against the tavernkeeper may result in a lien on the landlord's prem-
ises, and a liquidation thereof. The landlord's sole remedy apparently
is one of contract; either with his lessee, charging a rent sufficiently
high to protect him, or with an insurance company, to indemnify him.
The latter have become common since "Repeal."
III. RiGHTS OF THOSE TO WHOM THE CAUSE. Or ACTiON AcCRUEs.
-The final phase of this breakdown of this statute concerns the per-
sons to whom a right of action accrues under Section 135. The statute
explicitly designates "every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, em-
ployer or other person who shall be injured in person or property or
means of support" as the ones to whom a cause of action enures. By a
reading of this designation it appears clear that the requirement of an
injury is the feature that qualifies the rights of this broad group of
beneficiaries. The only person who is forbidden recovery is the intoxi-
cated person himself.
Exclusive of him, every other person injured in person or property
or means of support has a right of action, separate and several against
the tavernkeeper and the landlord jointly and severally. And a suit by
one of the designated beneficiaries of the cause of action is not a bar
to the other's suits. Thus where both wife and children were injured in
their means of support by the intoxication of the husband and father
respectively, a suit by the children did not preclude the mother's subse-
quent suit. The one was not res adjudicata as to the other.6
8
The injuries to person and property protected by the statute, it is
presumed, would be determined by the general law of torts, save for the
element of proximate causation, which the courts have held has been
modified by restricting words of the statute, as explained in a preced-
ing section of this writing.
Injury to means of support on the other hand has been held to give
a good cause of action to any person whom the intoxicated person was
supporting-either wholly or partially-immediately prior to the intox-
ication, whether such support was rendered by legal compulsion, or
mere voluntary contribution. In Deel v. Heiligenstein,6 9 a wife sued for
loss of support, caused by the husband's intoxication, and resultant
67 246 U. S. 97, 38 Su. Ct. 298, 621L. Ed. 596 (1918).
68 Stecher v. People, 217 Ill. 348, 75 N. E. S01 (1905).
69 244 MII. 239,91 N. E.,429 (1910).
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death, and the court allowed recovery, even though she was the bene-
ficiary of her hasband's life insurance policy. Stating a rule that seems
to be common in the cases, the court said: "the fact that the wife may
have a means of her own or an income from a source other than her
husband will not affect her right to recover damages under the Dram
Shop Act for an injury to her means of support on account of the death
of her husband." 70 Nor will the fact that a woman is able-bodied bar
her action, for a husband is bound to support his wife. 71 Nor may the
fact that her sons contributed to her support be shown in mitigation of
damages, as the loss from the husband's intoxication would be the same
regardless of the children's contribution, for they are not legally bound
to pay the mother, as their earnings legally belong to the father during
his lifetime.
72
In Nagle v. Keller 73 the plaintiff's brother by his habitual drunken-
ness was unable to work, and had no money or property. A pauper
statute made the brother subject to criminal prosecution if he did not
support his sister, who herself was unable to earn a livelihood; the
court allowed the sister recovery, even though she had no civil remedy
to compel her brother to support her.
One case, at least, Gilmore v. Killion,74 has gone even further, estab-
lishing the doctrine that there need be no legal duty to support the
plaintiff, to give a right of recovery. There it was held that a mother
need not prove that her son was legally bound to support her, so long
as he actually did support her, until intoxication disabled him. This
would seem to establish the rule that loss of voluntary support gives a
right of action to the injured party.
However, as has been pointed out by the holding of the other cases
found, though they do -not expressly state there must be a legal duty to
support the plaintiff to allow recovery, the courts seem to search for a
legal obligation of support, and stress it in allowing recovery.
The damages provided by the statute for injury to person, property,
or means of support of the designated persons are two-fold: actual and
exemplary. The ordinary rules in determination of such damages ap-
plies. The actual damages must be proved; they do not include mental
anguish or suffering or anguish.75 Exemplary or punitive damages are
recoverable only when actual damages are awarded,76 and then, only
when it is found to be a willful or wanton sale, as a sale or gift to one
70 Accord: Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 I1. 109 (1875); Danley v. Hibbard 222
I1. 88, 78 N. E. 39 (1906).
71 Hackett v. Smesley, 77 II. 109 (1875).
72 McMahon v. Sankey,g133 II. 640, 24 N. E. 1027 (1890).
73 237 11. 431, 86 N. E. 694 (1908).
74 281 Ill. 154, 118 N. E. 36 (1917).
75 Brantigam v. While, 73 Ill. 561 (1874).
76 Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873); Confrey v. Stark, 73 11. 187 (1874);
Buck v. Maddock, 167 Ill. 219.
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after a notice to desist,77 or to one known to be an habitual drunk-
ard,78 or one already intoxicated.
70
Both types of damages are recoverable against both the actual dis-
penser and the landlord.8 0 However, against the surety of the tavern-
keeper, required by statute, only compensatory or actual damages are
recoverable. 8 '
The actual amount of damages recovered under this statute is not
limited in any way by the "wrongful death" statute. They are passed
under separate powers, and are mutually exclusive. 82 Actual plus ex-
emplary damages thus are not confined to a maximum of $10,000, but
may extend to any sum which the jury thinks reasonable under the
circumstances.
From an application of this Act, then, it can be readily seen that the
legislature of Illinois has imposed on tavernkeepers and their landlords
a very stringent and harsh responsibility.
Upon the tavernkeeper, already policed to the maximum by every
taxing body authorized, is heaped the added burden of insurer of per-
sonal and property rights, against injury caused by another. Even legal
sales-say, one or two bottles of beer-sold to one more eager than
experienced in the art of drinking, may make the tavernkeeper liable to
the full extent of injuries caused by this unsuspected merry-maker.
And yet, if the tavernkeeper sells only one or two bottles of beer to
each customer, ordinarily he could not net enough to pay his varied
licenses. Certainly this is a dilemma he faces.
Upon the landlord falls a more stringent liability; strictly vicarious,
it compels him-if he would escape liability-to select fit customers for
his lessee to sell to, yet precludes a determination of who are "fit" cus-
tomers of the drink, save by the process of elimination, and every elim-
ination means a liability suit on his hands. Is it any wonder then that
the lessor passes the buck, and either requires higher rent of the lessee
or demands that the tavernkeeper protect him by insuranceI Here
again, it's the tavernkeeper who pays.
The object of the statute is the protection of personal and property
rights against drunkards. As such, its policy is commendable. It would
seem though, that the method of attaining such desirable end could be
less vindictive, yet still provide a reasonable protection of property. A
77 Wolfe v. Johnson, 152 Il. 281, 38 N. E. 886 (1894); McEvoy v. Hum-
phrey, 77 I. 388 (1875).
78 Siegle v. Rush, 173 Ill. 559, So N. E. 1008 (1898).
79 Betting v. Hobbett, 42 Ill. App. 174 (1891) affd. 142 Ill. 72, 47 N. E. 208
(1897) ; Earp v. Lilly, 217 Ill. 582, 75 .N. E. 552 (1905).
80 Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109 (1875).
81 Wanack v. People, 187 311. 116, 58 N. E. 242 (1900).
82 Austin v. Bass, 211 Ill. App. 1 (1919).
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statute confining liability to dispensers - and even landlords - who
served intoxicants after notice to desist, or a warning as to, or actual
knowledge of a certain person's habits or capacity, would give the tav-
ernkeeper a fair chance to protect himself.
Even dogs, by common law, are entitled to one bite before their
master is liable for injuries such dogs cause.
The tavernkeeper, it is submitted, is entitled to like consideration.
John R. Vicars.
LABOR AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.---"The Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes..." 1
The first case to reach the Supreme Court which involved a con-
struction of the "Commerce Clause" was the famous "Steamboat Case"
of Gibbons v. Ogden, which was decided in 1824.2 This litigation grew
out of a conflict between a monopoly which the State of New York had
conferred upon certain persons to navigate steamboats upon the waters
of that State and an Act of Congress regulating coastwise trade. The
case, therefore, raised directly the scope of Congress' power over inter-
state commerce.8 Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion defined com-
merce as follows: "Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is some-
thing more; it is intercourse." Speaking of commerce among the several
States, he continued, "The word 'among' means intermingled with. A
thing which is among others is intermingled with them. Commerce
among the States cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
State, but may be introduced into the interior... The genius and char-
acter of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be ap-
plied to all of the external concerns of the Nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are
completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of execu-
ting some of the general powers of the government. The completely in-
ternal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the
State itself. .."
Chief Justice Marshall went on to say that the power to regulate,
like all other powers vested in Congress by the Constitution, is com-
plete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than those specifically restricted by the Constitu-
1 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3. Generally
known, and hereinafter referred to as the "Commerce Clause."
2 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23, (1823).
8 The Commerce Power v. States Rights, Corwin, (1936), pp. 5, 6.
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tion; that all powers not so specifically granted to Congress were re-
served in the States, since Congress derives any powers it has, from
the States. Hence the issue arises whether Congress has the power to
regulate the maximum hours and minimum wages of the employees of
a person (meaning individual, partnership, or corporation) whose busi-
ness is, in some degree, connected with interstate commerce; and specif-
ically, when such employees are limited in their activities exclusively
within a State.
This leads to a treatment of the first of the Child Labor Cases,
Hammer v. Dagenhart.4 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court
held void an Act of Congress prohibiting the interstate transportation
of goods manufactured with the aid of child labor. Mr. Justice Day, in
his majority opinion, expressed the view that such an Act tended to
regulate a right reserved in the States under the guise of the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. He said, "... The grant of
power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was to en-
able it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to con-
trol the States in the exercise of the police power over local trade and
manufacture. The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was
not intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully
reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to theConstitution...
The power of the States to regulate their purely internal affairs by such
laws as seem wise to the local authority is inherent and has "never been
surrendered to the general government. 5 To sustain this statute would
not be in our judgment a recognition of the lawful exertion of con-
gressional authority over interstate commerce, but would sanction an
invasion by the federal power of control of a matter purely local in its
character, and over which no authority has been delegated to Congress
in conferring the power to regulate commerce among the States..."
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking on behalf of the minority, indicated
the future trend of decisions. He said, ". .. The Act does not meddle
with anything belonging to the States. They may regulate their in-
ternal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they
seek to send their products across the State line they are no longer
within their rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress their
power to cross the line would ddpend on their neighbors. Under the
Constitution such commerce belongs not to the States but to Congress
to regulate."
Holmes was of the further opinion that this case did not differ from
that of Champion v. Ames, 6 wherein the Supreme Court fifteen years
before, held that the power to regulate commerce is the power to pro-
4 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed..1101, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, (1918).
5 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873).
6 188 U. S. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, (1903).
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hibit transportation of articles deemed dangerous to public health and
morals, under the general welfare clause of the Constitution. 7
It is interesting to note Holmes' reflection on substantially the same
problem of commerce, and where the line is to be drawn between inter-
state and intrastate, in the case of Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.8
This litigation arose involving a State's right to the regulation and
transportation of its natural gas to other States, which the Supreme
Court held a lawful object of interstate commerce and subject to reg-
ulation by the Federal Government. With this phase of the case, we
are not here concerned, but Justice Holmes' vigorous dissenting opin-
ion is worthy of note wherein he said that the products of a State, un-
til they are actually started to a point outside, may be regulated by
the State notwithstanding the Commerce Clause. The decision of this
case tends to show the broad construction the Court places on the Com-
merce Clause as applied to the regulation of what were formerly con-
sidered rights reserved in the States.
In 1935, Justice Roberts spoke on behalf of the majority in a five
to four decision of the case of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-
road Co.9 This case involved an Act of Congress requiring railway car-
rier's to contribute to a pension fund for superannuated employees. The
Act was held void as violative of both the Commerce Clause, and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 0 Speaking of the Com-
merce Clause, Mr. Justice Roberts said, in effect, that it was apparent
that the provisions of the Act under -consideration, essentially related
to the social welfare of the worker and was therefore remote from any
regulation of commerce as such. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking on
behalf of himself and Justices Brandeis, Stone, and the late Justice
Cardozo, in the dissenting opinion, said, ". .. The fundamental con-
sideration which supports this type of legislation is that industry should
take care of its human wastage, whether it is due to accident or age...
When expressed in the government of interstate carriers with respect
to their employees likewise engaged in interstate commerce, it is a reg-
ulation of that commerce. As such, as far as the subject matter is con-
cerned, the Commerce Clause should be held applicable." Again, this
is indicative of the broad construction of the Commerce Clause, and
predicts the extensive scope to which it shall be applied.
In the Minnesota Rate Cases," Chief Justice Hughes, in speaking
of Justice Marshall's statement in Gibbons v. Ogden (supra) regarding
reservation in the States of commerce completely internal, said,"... This
7 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1.
8 262 U. S. 553, 67 L. Ed. r117, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923).
9 295 U. S. 330, 79 L. Ed. 1468, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935).
10 "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; . . ."
11 Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, (1913).
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reservation to the States manifestly is only of that authority which is
consistent with and not opposed to the grant of Congress. There is no
room in our scheme of government for the assertion of State power in
hostility to the authorized exercise of Federal power. The authority
of Congress extends to every part of interstate commerce, and to every
instrumentality or agency by which it is carried on; and the full con-
trol by Congress of the subjects committed to its regulation is not to
be denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate
operations. This is not to say that the Nation may deal with the in-
ternal concerns of the State, as such, but that the execution by Congress
of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is not
limited by the fact that intrastate transactions may have become so
interwoven therewith that the effective government of the former in-
cidentally controls the latter. This conclusion necessarily results from
the supremacy of the national power within its appointed sphere."
And a year later in the Shreveport Case 2 Hughes again said,
. . Its (Congress') authority extending to these interstate carriers
as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the
right to control their operations in all matters having such a close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential
or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of inter-
state service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which inter-
state commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molesta-
tion or hinderance..."
As a result of "New Deal Legislation," three well known and much
discussed decisions were handed down, directly in point with the con-
struction of the Commerce Clause involving State rights. Schechter
Poultry Corporation v. United States,'3 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,'
4
and National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laugh~in Steel Cor-
poration.15 These cases will be treated in the order in which their de-
cisions were rendered to indicate the present trend of the Supreme Court
in treating the problem involved.
Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress claimed pow-
er under the Commerce Clause to regulate wages and hours in connec-
tion with productive industry in certain cases. This Act was declared
unconstitutional by a unanimous court in the Schechter Case for the
reason that there was an unlawful delegation of legislative powers to
the President to prescribe a code of fair competition wherein the leg-
islature failed to set a definite ascertainable standard for the per-
formance of these functions; a point with which this article is not
12 Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed.
1341, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1915).
18 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 97 A. L. R. 947, (1935).
14 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. Ed. 1160, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936).
15 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 108 A. L. R. 1352 (1937).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
concerned. And further, and in direct relation to this subject matter,
that Congress has no jurisdiction over intrastate commerce unless it
directly affects interstate commerce. Chief Justice Hughes, so far as
the Commerce Clause is involved, said, ". . . In determining how far
the Federal Government may go in controlling intrastate transactions
upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a
necessary and well established distinction between direct and indirect
effects. The precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise,
but the distinction is clear in principle... If the Commerce Clause were
construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said
to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal author-
ity would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the
authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by
sufferance of the Federal Government. Indeed, on such a theory, even
the development of the State's commercial facilities would be subject
to federal control.
"The distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate
transactions upon interstate commerce must be recognized as a funda-
mental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system.
Otherwise, as we have said, there would be virtually no limit to the
federal power, and for all practical purposes we should have a com-
pletely centralized government. . . If the Federal Government may
determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce
of a State, because of .. . their indirect effect upon interstate com-
merce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other
elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as the number of employees,
rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of
production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be con-
trolled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the per-
mitted object of federal control, the extent of regulation or cost would
be a question of discretion and not of power."
And later, Hughes continues, ". .. The apparent implication is that
the federal authority under the Commerce Clause should be deemed to
extend to the establishment of rules to govern wages and hours in
intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus
overriding the authority of the States to deal with domestic problems
arising from labor conditions in their internal commerce...
"... It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not
provide for it. Our growth and development have called for wide use
of the commerce power of the Federal Government in its control over
the expanded activities of interstate commerce in protecting that com-
merce from burdens, interferences and conspiracies to restrain and mo-
nopolize it. But the authority of the Federal Government may not be
pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the
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Commerce Clause itself establishes, between commerce 'among the
several States,' and the internal concerns of the State...
The court, in dealing with the Schechter Case, held the defendant
corporation's business "purely local," and in doing so, attempted to de-
fine or draw a line between intrastate and interstate commerce; quoting,
"... . The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities
into a State, that does not mean that the flow continues after the prop-
erty has arrived and has become commingled with the mass of prop-
erty within the State and is there held solely for the local disposition
and use. . ." In other words, once the flow of commerce stops, the com-
modity is necessarily subject to local regulation, and federal control
ceases with the flow. Should the same commodity be later shipped with-
out the State, even in an altered condition, the question whether it is
continuously subject to federal control will be treated in the considera-
tion of the Jones & Laughlin Case.
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 6 the court held that the pos-
sibility or even certainty of exportation of a product or article from a
State did not determine it to be in interstate commerce before the com-
mencement of its movement from the State.
The decision in the Schechter Case was shortly followed by Carter v.
Carter Coal Co. (supra) where the Supreme Court held the Guffey
Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional, proceeding substantially on
the same grounds involved in the rejection of the N. R. A. The Guffey
Act declared the production, distribution, and use of bituminous coal
to be affected with a national public interest. It also organized districts
and prescribed the power to regulate wages, working conditions, maxi-
mum hours, etc.
Mr. Justice Sutherland stated in the majority opinion,"... A con-
sideration of... many cases... renders inescapable the conclusion that
the effect of the labor provisions of the Act, including those in respect of
minimum wages, wage agreements, collective bargaining and the labor
board, and its powers, primarily falls upon production and not upon
commerce, and confirms the further resulting conclusion that produc-
tion is a purely local activity ... It follows that none of these essential
antecedents of production constitutes a transaction in or forms any
part of interstate commerce (citing Schechter Case). Everything which
moves in interstate commerce has its local origin. Without local pro-
duction somewhere, interstate commerce, as now carried on, would
practically disappear. Nevertheless, the local character of mining, of
manufacturing and of crop-growing is a factor and remains a fact,
whatever may be done with the products ...
". .. The conclusive answer is that the evils are all local evils over
which the Federal Government has no legislative control. The relation
16 260 U. S. 249, 67 L. Ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922).
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of employer-employee is a local relation. The wages are paid for doing
a local work. Working conditions are obviously local conditions. The
employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in
producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils, which it is the
object of the Act to regulate and minimize, are local controversies and
evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that local result.
Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it
may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the
effect adds to its importance. It does not alter its chararter..." (Jus-
tices Hughes, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting.)
Within a year after the decision of the Carter Coal. Co. case, the
Supreme Court handed down the decision in National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (supra), apparently re-
versing itself, if not in direct point, by obiter dictum. In this case, the
defendant corporation, was the fourth largest steel producer in the
United States, having plants situated in Pennsylvania, drawing raw
materials from various parts of the country and shipping approximate-
ly seventy-five per cent (75%) of its products out of the State. De-
fendant discharged ten employees for Union activity, and the National
Labor Relations Board found this to be an unfair labor practice under
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.17 The Board ordered de-
fendant corporation, inter alia, to offer reinstatement to the discharged
employees and to cease and desist from like practices, and petitioned
the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order.' 8 Upon denial of
the order, the Board brought the petition to the Supreme Court on a
Writ of Certiorari, wherein the Circuit Court was reversed. Chief Jus-
tice Hughes wrote the opinion for the majority of the court, and stated,
"... The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions -is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign com-
merce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action spring-
ig from other sources. The fundamental principle is that the power
to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation'
for 'its protection and advancement' (Citing The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall.
557, 564): to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its
safety' (Citing County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697);
'to foster, protect, control and restrain.' That power is plenary and may
be exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of
the dangers which threaten it.' . . . Although activities may be intra-
state in character when separately considered, if they have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that con-
17 29 U. S. C. A. (Sec.) 166 (1935).
18 83 Fed. (2d) 998.
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trol. Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the
light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so
as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and re-
mote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would ef-
fectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government. Id. The ques-
tion is necessarily one of degree. . .As the court said in Stafford v.
Wallace, (supra); 'Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice,
and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of inter-
state commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause and it is primarily for Congress to consider and de-
cide the fact of the danger and meet it.' "
The Court indicated in this case that the intensity of the operations
carried on by the manufacturer was quite significant, which seemed to
be the controlling element of the decision. "It is idle to say," according
to the majority opinion, "that the effect would be indirect or remote.
It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic."
It was upon similar grounds and reasoning that the constitutionality of
the Labor Act was supported in its passage through Congress.19
At the time of the decision of the Jones & Laughlin Case, the Supreme
Court was considering the cases of National Labor Relations Board v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,20 and National Labor Relations
Board v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 2 1 both being in accord, and further sub-
stantiating the trend toward governmental regulation of production and
industry.
In the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corporation,2 2 a decision handed down February 27, 1939,
wherein sit-down strikes were held unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Hughes
said, "No question is raised as to the intimate relation of its (defend-
ant's) operations to interstate commerce or the effect upon that com-
merce of the unfair labor practices with which the corporation is
charged." However, in the dissenting opinion by Justice Reed, there
is an expression of the statutory construction of the Supreme Court,
worthy of mention in construing the purpose of the National Labor
Relations Act; he said, "The Labor Act was enacted in an effort to
protect interstate commerce from the interruptions of labor disputes.
This object was sought through prohibitions of certain practices deemed
unfair to labor, and the sanctions adopted to enforce the prohibitions in-
cluded the reinstatement of employees..
19 4 U. S.L.W. 1, & 24.
20 301 U. S. 58, 81 L. Ed. 921, 57 Sup. Ct. 645 (1937).
21 301 U. S. 49, 81 L. Ed. 918, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
22 6 U. S. L. W. 58 (1939).
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And in National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., Inc.; 23 handed down with the decision of the Fansteel
Case, the Union complained through the Labor Board that the defend-
ant engaged in unfair labor practices affecting interstate commerce
within the meaning of 8(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act as amended in 1938.24 The Board made findings that defendant
corporation of Terre Haute, Indiana, was engaged in the manufacture
and sale of metal utensils and other products in interstate commerce;
that defendant was engaged in unfair labor practices under 8(5) of
the Act, and ordered defendant to desist from refusing to bargain with
the Union. Application for a decree enforcing the Board's order was
refused on the ground that the employees had struck before the en-
actment of the National Labor Relations Act, and were not entitled to
the protection thereof.
These recent decisions tend to show the effect of late legislation and
the creation of administrative bodies on the powers of the Federal
Government to regulate, and perhaps prohibit, internal commerce of a
State that has an effect on interstate commerce, either direct or re-
mote, as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Ob-
viously, however, the problem is far from settled, and it would be im-
practicable, if not impossible, to accurately predict the relative future
trend.
Sam L. Devine.
University of Notre Dame.
REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR INJURIES DUE TO UNWHOLESOME FOOD.
-The slow, but sure flexibility of the law shows itself prominently
when trends away from established precedents transform themselves
into newly established rules, which, by creeping inroads settle down into
the books, and gradually push their predecessors into oblivion. Public
policy, custom, a different point of view all combine to hurry or slow
the process of this transformation. In a modem illustration, we see
public policy on the one hand speeding the process, custom on the
other definitely impeding it, and statutes supporting the policy angle
insufficiently covering the ground. The illustration is that of the liabil-
ity of a restaurateur who serves unwholesome food in his restaurant.
Is he liable for breach of an implied warranty of quality for selling
unfit food under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act? Is he liable
only for negligence in preparing food which he knows is to be used for
human consumption? Is the fact that he served food which was un-
23 6 U. S. L. W. 54 (1939).
24 29 U. S. C. A. (Sec.) 166 (1938).
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wholesome, negligence per se under the pure food statutes of the sev-
eral states, is it prima facie negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur? These questiuns have all been raised in the cases, and in the
cases are found decisions supporting all of these theories of liability.
For a long time, the well-established rule in cases against restaura-
teurs for serving food which has caused injury to a patron has been that
the restaurateur is only liable if he was negligent in preparing the foods.
As late as 1918 in the annotation to the case reported in 5 A. L. R.
1100,1 the following comment is found regarding the rule: "The weight
of authority, jurisdictionally at least, is to the effect that, in the absence
of statute, one serving food to be immediately consumed on the prem-
ises is neither an insurer of the fitness and wholesomeness of the food
served, nor liable upon an implied warranty thereof." This rule was
destined to be changed with a growing public demand that anyone who
handles food and distributes it should be forced to do so with the utmost
care since his business is so bound up with the health of the nation.
The Uniform Sales Act was passed which put a more stringent demand
on food dispensers, as well as sellers of other articles. Public policy had
'demanded that they be warrantors in the following pertinent section of
the Sales Act: 2 "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or
judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose." This act was not applied to an important division of food
dispensers, the restaurateurs, because of a custom. In former times when
a patron entered an inn, he paid a certain sum of money, and in return
received board and lodging. The innkeeper, it was said, "uttered his
provisions." The patron bought nothing. He merely paid for services,
part of which was the lodging, part of which was the serving of food.
The patron did not own the food until he ate it. He could not take away
with him an uneaten biscuit or a half of a steak, for the simple reason
that they did not belong to him. If the food happened to injure him, he
held the innkeeper liable only if he proved him negligent. Strangely
enough the fact that this serving of food was called a service instead of
a sale kept the Uniform Sales Act from applying to restaurateurs until
very recent cases have abolished the distinction. The early cases held,
and cases in about half of the jurisdictions which have decided the ques-
tion today hold that the serving of food in a restaurant is not a sale but
a seridice, and hence does not come within the scope of the Sales Act.
The following jurisdictions and situations represent the negligence
rule and indicate how strong the rule remains even today against severe
I Florence S. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co. 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407,
5 A. L. R. 100 (1918) (annotation, 5 A. L. R. 1115), (the case itself applied the
warranty theory).
2 Uniform Sales Act, Section 15 (1).
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criticism and powerful opposition in other jurisdictions. In F. W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Clevie Wilson,8 the federal circuit court of appeals held
that: "The liability of one preparing and serving to a customer an ice
cream soda to be consumed on the premises, for injury caused by a piece
of glass therein is in tort and not for breach of an implied warranty of
fitness and quality." The case moves on the theory that it is a service
and not a sale, hence does not come within the Sales Act. The same
theory has in recent years moved Delaware to hold to the same rule
where a splinter of bone was found in soup 4; New Jersey, where glass
was found in coleslaw .5; Rhode Island, where pieces of wire were dis-
covered in beef stew prepared and served by a lunch counter pro-
prietor 6 ; Louisiana, where spoiled cocoanut cream pie was served 7,
and following in the same line are cases in Alabama 8 ; Maine 0; Con-
necticut 10; Wisconsin 11; Illinois 1 2 and New Hampshire 13.
The negligence theory although used in a recent California case, was
there bent toward holding the restaurateur to a stricter liability. The
case held that where spoiled fish was served and it was so proven, the
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case against the defendant. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was invoked to make out the prima facie
case. 14 Another California case shortly after was decided the same
way.15 Previous to this, the courts had consistently refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to this situation. The attitude of the courts
in this regard is shown by a statement from Sheffer v. Willoughby:'6
"A person injured by eating unwholesome food at a public restaurant
must, in order to recover damages, establish carelessness or negligence
on his part." Many cases have followed this rule.17 Although the Cali-
fornia courts seemed to have stretched the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
a bit, the cases invoking the doctrine in such manner at least indicate
3 74 F. (2d) 439, 98 A. L. R. 681 (1934). For further annotations see the fol-
lowing: 5 A. L. R. 1115, 35 A. L. R. 921, 50 A. L. R. 231, 98 A. L. R. 687, 104
A. L. R. 1033.
4 Roseberry v Wachter, 33 Del. 323, 138 Atl. 273 (1925).
5 Corin v. Kresge Co., 10 N. J. Mis. R. 489, 159 At]. 799 (1932).
6 Chisolm v. S. S. Kresge Co., 55 R. I. 422, 182 AUt. 4, (1935).
7 Wilson v. Moore 159 So. 399 (La. App. 1935).
8 McCarley v. Wood Drugs, 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934).
9 Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912).
10 Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Al. 533, L. R. A. 1915B, 481 (1914)
Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co. 117 Conn. 128, 167 Atl. 99, (1933).
11 Prinson v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N. W. 905 (1927).
12 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253, 34 L. R. A. 464 (1896).
18 Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N. H. 427, 128 AUl. 343 (1925).
14 Stell v. Townsend Cal. Glace Fruits, Inc., 28 P. (2d) 1077 (Cal., 1934).
15 Smith v. McClary, 82 P. (2d) 712 (Cal., 1938).
16 163 Ill. 518,45 N. E. 253, 34 L. R. A. 464 (1896).
17 Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E. 396, 4 A. L. R.
1556 (1918), Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. S. 798 (1916), Travis v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So. 851 (1913), O'Brien v. Louis K. Ligget Co., 255
Mass. 553, 152 N. E. 57, 47 A. L. R. 146 (1926).
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how the courts are reacting to a public demand for stricter liability on
the part of restaurateurs. In the Massachusetts case of O'Brien v. Louis
K. Liggett Co.18 a clear contrast to the California cases is shown. It was
there said: "The mere presence of particles of glass in a strawberry
shortcake sold for consumption at a drug store, the ingredients of which
were purchased of dealers in such articles does not establish a prima
facie case of negligence on the part of the druggist which will render
him liable for injury to a customer in attempting to eat the cake."
The warranty theory holds restaurateurs who serve unfit food
liable in an action for the breach of an implied warranty to their cus-
tomers, that the food served is fit for the purpose intended. It has been
used by calling the transaction of selling food in a restaurant a sale and
bringing the restaurateur under the Uniform Sales Act, and it has been
used without even referring to the sales act, and completely ignoring the
distinction between sale and service, which is blocking the application
of the Uniform Sales Act in some of the states. The warranty theory is
more than a trend today. It would not be far wrong to say it is the
majority rule. Courts supporting this theory hold that dispensing food
in a restaurant is a sale and not a service, that the old custom of call-
ing it a service is obsolete for present day purposes, and that it is a weak
base on which to rest an argument against the imposition of a present-
day salutary rule which has been demanded by public policy. A pioneer
case in the warranty theory field is Florence S. Friend v. Childs Dining
Hall Co.19 In this case the plaintiff ordered baked beans, started to
chew them, and bit on something hard which injured her teeth. The
hard particles were stones, and in a suit for damages it was held: "The
rule that it is an implied term in every sale of provisions by a dealer
for immediate use, where the selection is not made by the buyer, that
the food is fit for consumption, applies to food furnished by the keeper
of a restaurant to i patron, to be consumed on the premises," and that,
"The liability of the proprietor of an eating house to his guest for serv-
ing bad food rests upon an implied term of the contract, and does not
sound exclusively in tort, although he may be held for negligence if
that be proved." It is to be noted in this case that there was no discus-
sion about the distinction between a service and a sale. They held to
the breach of warranty theory without making use of the distinctibn.
Such action by the court in ignoring the distinction is a strong indica-
tion of the trend towards absolute liability. The next case, which defi-
nitely brought in the Uniform Sales Act and called the transaction a
sale, thus imposing the theory of implied warranty of quality the same
as to any other sale, was in New York.20 This case held that where a
customer enters a restaurant and receives, eats and pays for food deliv-
18 255 Mass. 553, 152 N. E. $7, 47 A. L. R. 146 (1926).
19 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R. 1100 (1918).
20 Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924).
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ered to him on his order, the transaction is a purchase of goods; that the
purchaser impliedly makes known to the vendor the particular purpose
for which the article is required; and that where he may assume that
the vendor has had the opportunity to examine it, it conclusively ap-
pears that he relied on the vendor's skill or judgment so that there is an
implied warranty that the food is reasonably fit for consumption. The
action in this case was brought to recover for loss and damage alleged
to have been caused the plaintiff by sickness resulting from her eating
fish in the defendant's restaurant. The fish was unwholesome and unfit
for human food whereby she became ill from ptomaine poisoning. The
case sets up a conflict with cases refusing to apply the Uniform Sales
Act to the restaurateur situation, but the case represents the new rule,
which already has been adopted in many states. In accord with the
warranty theory are recent cases in Pennsylvania, 21 where a spoiled
pork sandwich was served; Kansas,22 where an unwholesome salad
sandwich was prepared and served at a store lunch counter; and in ac-
cord are Ohio,23 Indiana,
24 Washington, 25 Texas,2 6 and California.
27
Following in the wake of the warranty theory of liability in this type
of case come its ramifications. To hold anyone for a breach of contract,
you must show that there was privity of contract, so as to impose on
him the implied warranty. So in Prinsen v. Russos,28 a Wisconsin case,
where a woman became sick from pie that was bought by another
woman in her party, it was held, that since there was no privity, there
could not be a breach of contract, and hence the restaurateur could not
be held for breach of warranty. Another distinction has been made
while applying the theory in a California case.2 9 It was held that a
restaurateur was not liable on the ground of implied warranty or negli-
gence for injuries sustained by a customer from swallowing a fragment
of a turkey bone contained in a serving of roast turkey with dressing
which was purchased by the customer. The distinction, and I believe
it is a wise one in view of the harshness of the warranty theory, comes
in the reason for the rule of this case. It was said: "Bones which are
natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a for-
eign substance,, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to antici-
pate and be on his guard against the presence of such bones." It held
that a turkey bone was not foreign to the substance, and hence could
21 West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Super 118, 162 At. 685, (1932).
22 Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 53 P. (2d) 878 (Kan. 1936).
23 Clark Rest. Co. v. Simmons, 29 Oh. App. 220, 163 N. E. 210 (1927),
Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 17 N. E. (2d) 731 (Ohio 1938).
24 Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551, 149 N. E. 182 (1925).
25 State v. Grays Harbor Commercial Co., 124 Wash. 227, 214 Pac. 13 (1923).
26 H. S. Kress & Co. v. Ferguson, 60 S. W. (2d) 817 (Texas 1933).
27 Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 683, 59 P. (2d) 142 (1935), Mix v,
Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 674, 59 P. (2d) 144 (1936).
28 194 Wis. 142, 215 N. W. 905 (1927).
29 Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 83 P. (2d) 76 (Cal. 1938).
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not be called a deleterious particle of the type which should make for a
breach of warranty of quality for fitness for consumption. The California
court thus prevents the warranty theory from being carried to absurd
limits.
The most interesting recent case involving all the questions in this
discussion is an Ohio case.3 0 It was an action to recover for injuries
suffered by plaintiff from drinking contaminated water furnished at the
defendant's restaurant, supplied from a well belonging to the defendant.
The defendant contended that, although the food supplied in a restau-
rant is a sale transaction and not a service, yet here the supplying of
this water was a mere gratuity, and not a part of the dinner, and there-
fore was not connected with the sale. The case brings in another angle
on the sales-service controversy. The court concluded, however, that
water was just as much a part of the sale as the food, in view of the
fact that in this part of the world it long has been the definitely estab-
lished custom for restaurants and hotels to supply their customers with
water for drinking purposes as much as they supply salt, pepper, butter,
and similar articles for which no specific charge is made.
The best way to indicate the changed point of view which is perme-
ating the decisions is to note cases in the same state which are contra,
the prior showing the old rule, and the later one showing the changed
attitude. California offers the best recent example. In 1934 in the case
of Stell v. Townsend California Glace Fruits, Inc.,31 it was held that
the restaurant proprietor was not liable for breach of warranty. It was
stated that the proprietor of a restaurant is not an insurer nor is he
chargeable with an implied warranty of the quality of the food served to
patrons. This is very definite, and yet 1935 finds California reversing
itself in the case of Goetten v. Owl Drug Co. 3 2 where it was stated:
"Ordinarily a patron at a lunch counter makes known at least by impli-
cation that he desires wholesome food. He relies on the proprietor's
skill and judgment to produce food which can be eaten without dele-
terious effect," and that, "The application of the rule of implied war-
ranty to cases such as that before us may impose a heavy burden on
keepers of restaurants and lunch counters, but considerations of public
policy and public health and safety are of such importance as to demand
that such an obligation be imposed. As between patron, who has no
means of determinhg whether the food served is safe for human con-
sumption, and the seller who has the opportunity of determining its
fitness the burden properly rests with the seller who could have so
cared for the food as to have made the injury to the customer impos-
sible." In this case glass was found in chow mein delivered to the res-
taurateur by an outside manufacturer.
30 Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 17 N. E. (2d) 731 (Ohio 1938).
31 28 P. (2d) 1077 (Cal. 1934).
32 6 Cal. (2d) 683, 59 P. (2d) 142 (1935).
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It has so far been seen how a trend was impeded by a custom, how
nevertheless states inclined toward stricter accountability, some as Mas-
sachusetts by disregarding old distinctions, others by invoking res ipsa
loquitur, others by over-ruling the old idea of calling the serving of
food a service, and calling it a sale, thus making the transaction ame-
nable to the Uniform Sales Act provisions.
There is another phase of the problem, which is public policy mani-
festing itself in its most potent form, namely in a definite statute hold-
ing a restaurateur who serves deleterious food answerable to the state
under a criminal statute. One state has a statute so clear that there is
no need to think about breach of warranty or negligence when this
problem arises. That state is Minnesota. Its statute is in the pure food
section of its acts, and reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to manufacture, sell, use, transport, offer for sale or transporta-
tion or have in possession with intent to use, sell or transport, any
article of food which is adulterated, misbranded, insufficiently labeled,
unwholesome, poisonous or deleterious within the meaning of this
act." 33 To show the efficacy of this statute as a substitute for all other
theories, we may look at a Wisconsin case,3' which interpreted the
Minnesota statute. (Wisconsin so far has not even adopted the war-
ranty theory.) The case arose when a woman ate a turkey dinner at
defendant's lunch counter in Duluth, Minnesota. The defendant was
sued in Wisconsin, but the Minnesota law applied, and the court of
Wisconsin said: "We are of the opinion that the law of Minnesota has
created a tort liability in favor of a person injured by the eating of
unwholesome, poisonous or deleterious food sold to him, that under that
law this liability exists independently of any showing of culpability
other than a showing of a violation of the statute. We thus reach the
conclusion that death resulting as found by the jury in the case at bar
under the Minnesota law constitutes death by a wrongful act and cre-
ates a cause of action for damages resulting to her from her illness. The
result reached makes it unnecessary to, examine the question as to
whether there is any cause of action for breach of warranty which sur-
vives, or may be the basis of an action for wrongful death." This stat-
ute certainly is the most definite in making the restaurateur absolutely
liable for serving bad food. The statute imposes the liability, and if it is
found that the bad food was served, the liability arises automatically.
The question now presents itself as to the possibility of invoking the
provisions of other pure food statutes to circumvent the necessity of
litigating the question of warranty or negligence in those states which
do not have such a definite presentation as that given in the Minne-
sota case. Two cases engender the thought that in those states whose
courts have refused to apply the warranty theory, it might be wiser to
83 Minn. Stat. (Mason's) 1927 § 3789.
84 Doherty v. S. S. Kresge Co., 227 Wis. 254, 278 N. W. 437 (1938).
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attempt to bring the defendant who has served bad food in under a pure
food statute, thus obviating the necessity of litigating the question of
whether or not he was negligent. The first case was decided as early as
1923 in the State of Washington.35 It held that the furnishing of decom-
posed and contaminated meat by an employer with the meals served to
its employees at its boarding house, for which a charge was made by
deducting the board from the employees' wages was a sale within the
statutes forbidding the sale of adulterated or misbranded food,86 and a
sale of adulterated food with the statute defining adulterated food.
3 7
This case was a prosecution by the state, but it certainly leaves the door
open for a civil suit for damages. An even better case was the recent
interesting Ohio case 38 which held that the restaurant was liable for
serving contaminated water to a patron. Besides deciding in that case
that, "A restaurant owner who supplies his customers with water for
drinking purposes from his own well impliedly warrants the reasonable
fitness of such water for its intended use," the case also decided, per-
haps to make the decision strong, that "the supplying of water that is
unfit for human consumption constitutes a violation of the pure food
laws of Ohio" and that "such violation is negligence per se." Would it
not have been sufficient ground for recovery if the pure food statute
alone were invoked, if it were found to be violated, if it were found
that such violation was negligence per se? Would it have-been neces-
sary to even mention the warranty or negligence theories? It is quite
obvious that it would not. It is hard to see why the question of negli-
gence or warranty were used at all, unless, of course, this is the first
time that the pure food statute was invoked in just this way, and the
other theories were used as security in the event that the court did not
see the violation of the statute. The pertinent parts of the Ohio Code
which were used in deciding the case were as follows:
Section 5774: "No person, within this state, shall manufacture for sale, offer for
sale, sell or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell or
deliver, a drug or article of food which is adulterated within the
meaning of this chapter."
Section 5778: "Food, drink, confectionery or condiments are adulterated within
the meaning of this chapter (1) if any substance or substances
have been mixed with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously
affect its quality, strength or purity; . . . (5) if it consists wholly,
or in part, of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected, tainted or
rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufac-
tured or not or in the case of milk, if it is the product of a dis-
eased animal; . . . (7) if it contains any added substance or
ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health;
Section 12758 provides for a penalty for the sale of adulterated food as defined
by the act.
35 State v. Grays Harbor Comm. Co., 124 Wash. 227, 214 P. 13 (1923).
386 Rem. Code (Wash.) § 5453.
37 Rem. Code (Wash.) § 5455.
88 Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 17 N. E. (2d) 731 (Ohio 1938).
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All of the states, which, in the above discussion, have been cited as
adhering to the old negligence theory of restaurateur's liability have
pure food laws similar to that of Ohio's. The possibility of invoking such
statutes to circumvent the necessity of litigating the negligence theory
seems very appealing at this time, in view of the recent Ohio case. It is
not so important where the warranty theory is established, since the
Uniform Sales Act is just as effective, and if the rule is established there
is no risk of coming out on the losing side of a freshly litigated question.
It should be worth the risk in the negligence states, however, to get
away from the necessity of having to bear the burden of proving the
restaurateur negligent in preparing his food. To use as an example a
state which has consistently adhered to the negligence theory, and at
the same time has a pure food statute forbidding the sale of adulterated
food, we find New Jersey with the following statute:
" . . food shall be deemed adulterated:
e. if it contain any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient
which may render it injurious to health . . .
f. If it consists in whole or in part of a filthy, decomposed or putrid ani-
mal or vegetable substance, or any portion of an animal unfit for food,
whether manufactured or not, or if it is the product of a diseased animal
or one that had died otherwise than by slaughter." 89
"No person shall distribute or sell, or manufacture for distribution or sale, or
have in his possession with intent to distribute or sell, any food or drug, which
under any of the provisions of this subtitle is adulterated or misbranded." 40
This statute is a model that is more or less standard throughout the
pure food acts of the states, although a little different than the Ohio
statute. To work out the possibility of using them, it must be noted that
it is well settled in the law of torts that, "When a duty imposed by
statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of individ-
uals, the.common law when an individual is injured by a breach of the
duty will supply a remedy if the statute gives none." 41 Surely no stat-
ute satisfies more neatly the requirement that the statute must have
been intended for the protection and benefit of individuals than the pure
food statutes, whose purpose is to protect the health of individuals.
Obviously the statutes could be invoked in cases where a restaurateur
serves bad food, and the courts should hold it negligence per se when
the restaurateur serves bad food in violation of the statutes. This pro-
cedure should save immeasurable difficulty in the matter of attempting
to prove negligence in those states which have the negligence theory,
and it would even save difficulty in those states which allow suit for a
39 Rev. Stat. N. J. (1938) 24:5-8.
40 Rev. Stat. N. J. (1938) 24:5-1.
41 2 COOLEY ON ToRTS (3rd ed.) 1408; Baldwin v. Washington Motor Coach
Co., 82 P. (2d) 131 (Wash. 1938); Holmes v. Merson, 285 Mich. 136, 280 N. W.
139 (1938); Anderson v. Carter, 118 S. W. (2d) 891 (Tenn. 1938); Jolley v.
Clemens, 82 P. (2d) 51 (Cal. 1938); Burk v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 102
N. W. 793 (1905).
